Implementing a Curriculum for Foreign Policy Expertise

How do we make this happen?

The Foreign Service Institute (FSI) is “the U.S. government’s premier foreign affairs training provider.”

For the last few weeks I’ve been writing about a core curriculum to develop foreign policy expertise — previous posts include: 1) an evaluation of the status quo, 2) some reader responses, and 3) a comprehensive reading list. I believe such a curriculum would strengthen our national security.

Yet I am motivated to do this work not merely as a thought experiment, but because I actually want to help foreign affairs agencies improve their core functions. As such, I’d like to conclude this mini-series focused on the question of how to implement a new curriculum (rather than what that curriculum should be).

How to implement a curriculum?

One of my beliefs is that careerists at the State Department, especially the careerist Foreign Service folks, must take the lead in demanding high standards for training. Career diplomats have failed for generations to convince presidents that they possess specialized expertise that differentiates them from others in the national security process (as evidenced by the growing rates of political appointees and the marginalization of diplomats in the policy process). Challenging this narrative won’t happen by simply asserting their self-superiority. The institution must raise the bar for itself and invest in cutting-edge new skills.

The most obvious location for implementing a curriculum is at the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute (FSI), which bills itself as “the U.S. government’s premier foreign affairs training provider.”

Indeed, it is Congress’s stated desire that the State Department improve its curriculum. In January 2023, it passed bipartisan legislation that required the State Department to develop a core curriculum, a non-partisan board of advisors at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) to provide recommendations on curriculum, and a Provost position at FSI to oversee curriculum and evaluation. State has taken some tentative steps in this direction, but a lot of work remains to be done.

There are a handful of pathways down which the State Department might proceed:

1. Impose the curriculum as a requirement. Simply require that all Foreign Service officers enroll in a class at FSI that covers the full curriculum. Maybe it’s required for everyone, only new officers, or for any officer being promoted to a FS-2 / GS-14 level. The requirement could be phased in over time. I estimate that my suggested curriculum would take about two months of full-time coursework. It would be costly to roll 7,000 diplomats through training, but I think it would be powerful if a new Secretary of State announced a “transformational year of training” and everyone had to go through it together.

2. Design a test to evaluate competency. A more cost-effective approach would be to develop a standardized test that evaluates officials’ mastery of the curriculum. Test prep could be offered via voluntary classes, study groups, or self-guided study.

3. Incentivized but not required. Maybe a pay bump, or a commendation in one’s promotion file for those who undergo the curriculum and/or pass a competency exam.

4. Voluntary adoption. The most likely starting point (unfortunately) is that the new curriculum is designated as entirely voluntary. Indeed, this is where FSI’s current core curriculum stands today.  I am not confident that this model will have any meaningful impact on policymaking. High-level leadership could help, but has so far been lacking. It speaks volumes that our leaders don’t feel the need to undergo the core curriculum themselves. The Department might sponsor an official core curriculum reading group, perhaps led by a different 7th-floor official at each meeting. The Secretary of State’s team might host a monthly blog in which they reflect on how material drawn from the core curriculum helped advance diplomacy. The Foreign Service Institute could develop a speaker series drawn from the authors of its chosen curriculum.

5. Develop doctrine that harmonizes with the curriculum. Research suggests that training new skills that aren’t used on the job is a waste of time. The decision-making process must utilize the skills taught in training. Certain skills taught in the curriculum – analysis, strategy formation, program evaluation, etc. – might be formally spelled out in official doctrine. Such procedures could be spelled out in Executive Secretariat (S/ES) guidelines and included in the FAM.

To review, I think the benefits of a new curriculum would arrive in a number of ways:

1. Improve the quality of foreign policy by upgrading the techniques of analysis, decision-making, risk evaluation, etc.

2. Professionalize the practice of diplomacy and improve collaboration by creating a shared body of knowledge, skills, and standardized techniques.

3. Empower learning from success and failure in foreign policy by cultivating a more scientific approach to understanding the impact of our policies.

4. Enhance meritocracy by rewarding those who demonstrate more consistent success.

5. De-politicize foreign policy by cementing a clear role for highly trained careerists in the policy process.

Major Obstacles to implementation

I am dismayed by the messages I sometimes receive from policy professionals who report being stymied by the State Department in their efforts to advance better training. "The only way I think you can actually learn the job is by watching those who have done it well," asserted a former Dean of Training at FSI in an event focused on learning in diplomacy, suggesting that diplomacy is a “fuzzy art” that cannot be measured. (Watch the full video in that link and you’ll get a sense of just how distrustful some of our most powerful diplomats are to the value of a rigorous core curriculum.)

I attempt to document some of the obstacles here standing in the way of curriculum development for foreign policy:

1. Rejection of the value of this knowledge. While many studies on the practice of diplomacy suggest that diplomats would benefit from more training, there’s little agreement on what content would be most useful. Many (most?) senior leaders believe that the only useful knowledge in foreign policy resides in case studies and diplomatic history. Such advocates believe other forms of book knowledge lack applicability to the actual practice of policymaking.

2. Limited resources. Training is costly. The military has a 15% staffing surplus to account for a portion of their workforce to be away from their day jobs for training. The State Department, in contrast, complains of being chronically underfunded and understaffed.

3. Short-termist incentives. Leaders, especially political appointees, are more incentivized to respond to crises rather than invest in leadership for tomorrow. Notably, multiple Secretaries of State have won funding from Congress for major hiring sprees with the promise that extra staff would be sent to training, but new staff inevitably ends up being used to backfill ostensibly more pressing priorities (read Kori Schake’s book for more detail on this).

4. Butts in seats in the consular office. All new Foreign Service officers must serve at least one tour of duty in a consular section, conducting visa interviews and performing American citizen services. This work is vital and it generates a lot of money for the budget-challenged State Department. But this incentivizes rushing new diplomats out into the field to start generating revenue quickly rather than investing in lengthy training on the front end.

How Do We Choose the Ideal Curriculum?

The State Department needs a serious needs assessment process to continually shape its curriculum and training process. I don’t have a lot of visibility on the current process, but I understand it boils down to an informal survey of existing policymakers on what the next generation requires (please, dear readers, correct me if I’m wrong here). This seems to boil down to a tautological commitment to the “art” of foreign policy: “You know how we know foreign policy is an art? Because that’s how we do foreign policy.”

A more robust needs-assessment process should a) synchronize training with the skills necessary for the most important tasks in diplomacy, and b) rigorously evaluate whether training actually improves performance on those tasks. Evaluating the effectiveness of training might include, for instance, interviewing trainees and their bosses after the training session to see whether/which skills were actually used on the job. It also might compare performance over time between those who did not receive the training.

The first attempts at imposing a curriculum need not — will not! — be perfect. Any attempt must be subject to ongoing scrutiny and iterated based on feedback and evaluation. In this manner, the curriculum must be dynamic, constantly evolving in response to an ever-changing world. Sub-curricula might be developed for other specialties, such as foreign assistance, public diplomacy, economic, or management cones.

Ultimately, good ideas aren’t enough to change anything in Washington. Progress requires people in positions of authority to speak up and agitate for changes. If you found yourself agreeing with this series on a curriculum for foreign policy expertise, I hope you too will push for change. Please let me know how I can help — I would love to amplify your efforts.