Reactions to the State Department's Reorganization Plan from Rubio

Does this amount to a drastic overhaul or simply a streamlining?

https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/DOS-Reorg-4.21.2025.pdf

Diplomats have been waiting with bated breath to hear the Administration’s plans to reorganize the State Department. Last week, the New York Times published a report on a “draft” of the memo proposing a “drastic overhaul” of the Department’s structure. The memo turned out to be largely incorrect. This morning, Secretary of State Marco Rubio published the actual proposal for reorganizing the State Department. Many diplomats are breathing a sigh of relief, or admitting “this could be worse.” (The NYT, it’s worth noting, is nevertheless still naming this a “drastic overhaul,” perhaps embarrassed by their previous miss.)

Rubio is characterizing this plan “a broad reorganization.” A handful of bureaus are being cut, and more are being reorganized and recombined. I’ve seen reports that 132 offices will be closed, which might be right, but it appears that only a handful of bureaus will be closed, most of which were already somewhat marginal.

While strong advocates of diplomacy will argue that any cuts to the State Department right now are a bad idea, this proposal avoids cuts to any core diplomatic functions. The offices proposed for removal strike me as “add-on” functions, such as conflict or energy diplomacy, that can otherwise be handled by other offices or departments. Every new administration adds or subtracts some of these functions depending on its political views. That seems like fair game.

Rubio’s stated theory is that simplifying the org chart will simplify the Department’s clearance process (the consensus-based process used to craft policy), which will result in more responsive, efficient, and effective foreign policy. He writes that, “The Department has long struggled to perform basic diplomatic functions [because…] bureaus and offices fight to be included on the approval chains for the most mundane of memos, only then to reach agreement on drafts that are bloated in length while stripped of all meaning.” This is not a new analysis of the problem; it has been made by prominent Democratic officials, too.

And yet, I doubt Rubio’s medicine will cure the sickness. Using the same outdated decision-making recipe will not likely achieve different results simply because there are fewer cooks in the kitchen. A new culture will require procedural changes, not simply fewer actors. Rubio suggests a need to “confront the underlying bureaucratic culture that prevents the State Department from carrying out an effective foreign policy,” but this memo alone will not achieve that objective.

It will, of course, be important to see how this is all handled. Ideally, this reorganization will be accompanied by meaningful procedural changes to modernize the practice of diplomacy. The worst case scenario is that draconian staffing and funding cuts, and failure to appoint competent leaders, will cripple the Department’s operations. But I see that as a separate conversation.

Proposed Changes

Here is a full list of the proposed changes, according to my quick comparison of the draft org chart (pasted above) with an old org chart.

The biggest change is that the Undersecretariat for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights (J) has been axed, but some of its functions have been relocated:

• The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) has been cut

• Office of Global Criminal Justice (GCJ) and Trafficking in Persons (TIP) have been cut

• Democracy, Rights, and Labor (DRL) and Populations, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) have been moved to the Office of Foreign Assistance (F). International Religious Freedom (IRF) seems to have been folded into DRL.

• Immigration, Narcotics, and Law Enforcement (INL) has been moved to T

The Undersecretary for Political Affairs (P) will gain some meaningful authority:

• Loses its Counter Terrorism office (CT) to T

• Rubio announces that “All non-security foreign assistance will be consolidated in regional bureaus”

The Undersecretariat for Arms Control and International Security (T) also seems to be gaining some functions:

• INL and CT relocated here

• ISN (International security and non pro) and AVC (arms control, verification, and compliance) combined into a new Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Stability (ANS)

• New office of emerging threats. Maybe some STAS functions?

And so does the Undersecretariat for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment (E)

• The Science and Tech Advisor (STAS), Energy Resources (ENR), and Global Partnerships (GP) have been cut

• Global health security and diplomacy (GHSD) and Cyberspace and Digital Policy (CDP) were given a permanent home here (both previously reported to the Secretary)

The Office of Public Diplomacy (R) seems to survive largely intact:

• The Global Engagement Center, which had previously drawn the ire of Republicans, is gone.

• It appears that the Office of Spokesperson has been removed from R and will now get its own office (S/SPOX) reporting directly to the Secretary

Also noting that the Foreign Service Institute (M/FSI) seems to be missing from the organizational chart. This would, indeed, be a drastic move, but I’m going to assume this is merely a typo until I hear otherwise.

The new(ish) Office of the Coordinator for Foreign Assistance and Humanitarian Affairs (F):

• This office appears to have been moved from reporting directly to S to being on par with an undersecretariat, which is both a demotion in the hierarchy, but also an expansion of the breadth of its authority.

• F will reportedly be taking on some of USAID’s old humanitarian assistance functions, while other forms of development assistance will be handled by the regional bureaus in P

• F will now oversee the bureaus of DRL and PRM

The Undersecretary for Management (M)

• There appears to be a new Office of Global Acquisition (M/GA), which used to be conducted by Administration (A) bureau, if I’m not mistaken. I don’t know the story here.

• The Foreign Service Institute (FSI) is missing from this updated organizational chart, but I suspect (hope) this is merely a typo. If all training and language education is being eliminated from diplomacy, that would indeed but a radical change.

The Secretary’s office tends to collect authority over a handful of specialty offices, and there are some changes here, too:

• Dropping Global Women’s Issues (S/GWI), Diversity and Inclusion office (S/ODI)

• S/OCR (Office of Civil Rights) has swallowed up the former Ombudsman’s office (S/O)

• New S/SPOX office

• It appears from the lines on the org chart that the Executive Secretariat (S/ES) will now report through the Deputy Secretary’s of State (D and D-MR) rather than directly to the Secretary, but it’s not clear.