I like Rich Sanders' comments below and mostly agree with them (I almost always agree with Rich!). But I have to say that the re-org looks a little bit like it was designed by folks who had been in the job for, oh, about three months and had figured out what was wrong and how to fix it. I agree with moving the center of gravity (back) to the regional bureaus; eliminating a lot of special envoys, many of which are either "signaling" or the result of frustration with traditional diplomacy; and eliminating some redundancies. What I don't like is Rubio's tone. Ever since he took the job there has been an edge to his voice, a hint that the real problem is disloyalty and lack of alignment with the President's vision. Of course, reorganizing a bureaucracy to "align" with the current President's vision is a recipe for future chaos. And of course Rich is right, that the rubber will really meet the road when we learn their plans for overseas presence.
I have multiple thoughts. I largely agree that this is more box-shuffling than reorganization.
Functional issues will get less attention; this reshuffling reads like a regional bureau victory after years of guerrilla warfare. The CSO cut is a worthy one; mission never taken seriously by anyone on the state side and better not to be planning state-building - I never liked it. R survives, despite early reports it was gone, but programs severely contained and media on life support if that. I do not quite understand about non-security foreign assistance being in regional bureaus. Does that mean P will be running program in the regional bureaus? Unless there is serious training and reassignment of program personnel to the regional bureaus it means the death of most of those assistance programs, as regional bureaus lack capabilities in program management. The biggest missing piece (you know I am going to say this), or the biggest "chickening out on real reform" seems to me to be the failure to integrate planning and budgeting in one location, reporting to the Secretary. If I am right in this reading, once again a Secretary with an excellent opportunity to get ahold of strategic planning and budgeting has ducked and systematically disempowered himself (or herself - I dare not say "themselves"). Not surprising; Rubio comes from an experience base without any particular expertise in strategy and resources; it shows up every time. Neither did anyone before him...
Yes! Well said about "the biggest missing piece" being integrating planning and budgeting. It's hard to understand why they wouldn't jump at that opportunity.
I share your concern about the lack of capacity within regional bureaus for programmatic issues. I suspect it will be painful and messy in the short term. But I've always felt like it is dangerous that the regional bureaus don't prioritize programmatic skills -- I know you've written a lot about this too. So perhaps this will be the forcing function for P and FSOs to step up their game. If so, this could be really great for the Department and the Foreign Service.
Dan, just a correction, IRF will get folded into the new DRL (see the org chart). TIP will have a new home too, it's a statutorily required Congressional report.
Thanks for these corrections! You seem correct about DRL, but it's unclear to me where TIP will land -- I'm not convinced the preparation of a report will mean that TIP will have a whole new home.
On its face this looks like a fairly severe pruning rather than a substantive change. The State Department would remain structured like other foreign ministries around the world with geographic bureaus managing bilateral relations, some functional bureaus managing cross-cutting and multilateral issues, and some senior positions integrating them.
Of course, much of the work of several functional bureaus is on our participation in global negotiations, whether they be on refugees, international energy, or other issues. I presume we will still have some role in these, with the work taken over by surviving bureaus or our embassies but with fewer, less senior people, we will definitely be less present at these events.
Unanswered yet is how much shrinkage there will be of our overseas presence. If we do indeed walk away from our policy of near universal representation, this will mark a big change. Sooner or later we will be trying to manage an issue with some country—a UN vote, a terrorism crisis, etc.— by telephone. I suspect we won’t like the results.
And what will our foreign assistance look like? Are we really going out of the development and democracy assistance business, with just some residual humanitarian activity. If we do plan to reconstitute our assistance at some level, there will be a need for program management expertise—and thus some kind of central agency which has it. But that doesn’t seem to be where we are going.
I don’t want to defend every office and every position, foreign service or civil service. But beyond a certain point of needed trimming, you will get what you pay for and no more.
"much of the work of several functional bureaus is on our participation in global negotiations... with fewer, less senior people, we will definitely be less present at these events." I suspect you're right that we'll be less present. And certainly some of these cross-cutting issues will be prioritized by this administration regardless of the org chart. But I'm not convinced that smaller functional offices will lead to less effective foreign policy. I have a theory that the growth of functional bureaus and special envoys is more of a signalling exercise than a true expression of priorities. DRL grew large and made huge promises, but that doesn't mean that any particular administration was actually prioritizing human rights issues when push came to shove. I don't think it's unreasonable to expect that redirecting some of the responsibility for cross-cutting issues back to the powerful regional bureaus might actually lead to more thoughtfully constructed and effective strategies.
Regarding your point about shrinkage of overseas presence and the dangers of telephone diplomacy... I already think we're in that world (and I don't like the results). I don't think te State Department's experts have nearly the influence that they should within our policymaking process. Biden and Obama, for instance, built huge NSCs that moved the policy process gravity away from State.
Thanks for your comments though -- these are some really interesting questions.
I like Rich Sanders' comments below and mostly agree with them (I almost always agree with Rich!). But I have to say that the re-org looks a little bit like it was designed by folks who had been in the job for, oh, about three months and had figured out what was wrong and how to fix it. I agree with moving the center of gravity (back) to the regional bureaus; eliminating a lot of special envoys, many of which are either "signaling" or the result of frustration with traditional diplomacy; and eliminating some redundancies. What I don't like is Rubio's tone. Ever since he took the job there has been an edge to his voice, a hint that the real problem is disloyalty and lack of alignment with the President's vision. Of course, reorganizing a bureaucracy to "align" with the current President's vision is a recipe for future chaos. And of course Rich is right, that the rubber will really meet the road when we learn their plans for overseas presence.
I have multiple thoughts. I largely agree that this is more box-shuffling than reorganization.
Functional issues will get less attention; this reshuffling reads like a regional bureau victory after years of guerrilla warfare. The CSO cut is a worthy one; mission never taken seriously by anyone on the state side and better not to be planning state-building - I never liked it. R survives, despite early reports it was gone, but programs severely contained and media on life support if that. I do not quite understand about non-security foreign assistance being in regional bureaus. Does that mean P will be running program in the regional bureaus? Unless there is serious training and reassignment of program personnel to the regional bureaus it means the death of most of those assistance programs, as regional bureaus lack capabilities in program management. The biggest missing piece (you know I am going to say this), or the biggest "chickening out on real reform" seems to me to be the failure to integrate planning and budgeting in one location, reporting to the Secretary. If I am right in this reading, once again a Secretary with an excellent opportunity to get ahold of strategic planning and budgeting has ducked and systematically disempowered himself (or herself - I dare not say "themselves"). Not surprising; Rubio comes from an experience base without any particular expertise in strategy and resources; it shows up every time. Neither did anyone before him...
Yes! Well said about "the biggest missing piece" being integrating planning and budgeting. It's hard to understand why they wouldn't jump at that opportunity.
I share your concern about the lack of capacity within regional bureaus for programmatic issues. I suspect it will be painful and messy in the short term. But I've always felt like it is dangerous that the regional bureaus don't prioritize programmatic skills -- I know you've written a lot about this too. So perhaps this will be the forcing function for P and FSOs to step up their game. If so, this could be really great for the Department and the Foreign Service.
Dan, just a correction, IRF will get folded into the new DRL (see the org chart). TIP will have a new home too, it's a statutorily required Congressional report.
Thanks for these corrections! You seem correct about DRL, but it's unclear to me where TIP will land -- I'm not convinced the preparation of a report will mean that TIP will have a whole new home.
On its face this looks like a fairly severe pruning rather than a substantive change. The State Department would remain structured like other foreign ministries around the world with geographic bureaus managing bilateral relations, some functional bureaus managing cross-cutting and multilateral issues, and some senior positions integrating them.
Of course, much of the work of several functional bureaus is on our participation in global negotiations, whether they be on refugees, international energy, or other issues. I presume we will still have some role in these, with the work taken over by surviving bureaus or our embassies but with fewer, less senior people, we will definitely be less present at these events.
Unanswered yet is how much shrinkage there will be of our overseas presence. If we do indeed walk away from our policy of near universal representation, this will mark a big change. Sooner or later we will be trying to manage an issue with some country—a UN vote, a terrorism crisis, etc.— by telephone. I suspect we won’t like the results.
And what will our foreign assistance look like? Are we really going out of the development and democracy assistance business, with just some residual humanitarian activity. If we do plan to reconstitute our assistance at some level, there will be a need for program management expertise—and thus some kind of central agency which has it. But that doesn’t seem to be where we are going.
I don’t want to defend every office and every position, foreign service or civil service. But beyond a certain point of needed trimming, you will get what you pay for and no more.
Richard M. Sanders
Senior Foreign Service Officer, retired
Senior Fellow, Western Hemisphere
Center for the National Interest
"much of the work of several functional bureaus is on our participation in global negotiations... with fewer, less senior people, we will definitely be less present at these events." I suspect you're right that we'll be less present. And certainly some of these cross-cutting issues will be prioritized by this administration regardless of the org chart. But I'm not convinced that smaller functional offices will lead to less effective foreign policy. I have a theory that the growth of functional bureaus and special envoys is more of a signalling exercise than a true expression of priorities. DRL grew large and made huge promises, but that doesn't mean that any particular administration was actually prioritizing human rights issues when push came to shove. I don't think it's unreasonable to expect that redirecting some of the responsibility for cross-cutting issues back to the powerful regional bureaus might actually lead to more thoughtfully constructed and effective strategies.
Regarding your point about shrinkage of overseas presence and the dangers of telephone diplomacy... I already think we're in that world (and I don't like the results). I don't think te State Department's experts have nearly the influence that they should within our policymaking process. Biden and Obama, for instance, built huge NSCs that moved the policy process gravity away from State.
Thanks for your comments though -- these are some really interesting questions.