Dan, as I've said before in commenting on your previous articles, they are a very useful contribution to answering the question, "How do we know we're being effective?" Unlike a lot of people who tackle this, you have a deep understanding of the complexity of this world and the difficulties associated with measuring success. U.S. policy is usually an important but very seldom a determining factor in what happens in Country X. And, as we all know, foreign policy is indeed an art, and it's in part the art of managing rather than solving issues, challenges and crises. It's hard to measure the productivity of the Public Affairs Section and their management of the IV Program, Fulbright, the arts, and so on except over decades, and always anecdotally more than measurably. How do you measure maintaining relations with all political parties? I gave this a lot of thought over 34 years, participated with relative enthusiasm in GPRA and every other initiative, but I learned a lot more about what worked from the gut than from GPRA. When you walk in to the Vice Minister's office, and you learn that she had a Fulbright at Duke 20 years ago - that's evidence of effectiveness! Anyway, a great piece and a great contribution to a challenging discipline. Keep writing.
Yeah, it's really hard. Even if gut instinct is all one's got, you can at least write it down, hold yourself accountable to your prediction, and try to learn from the outcome. The goal is not to be perfect, but to learn.
Excellent as usually, and broadly applicable to the field of foreign relations and diplomacy. The challenges you point out are a common denominator across ministries of foreign affairs across the globe; I've experienced it first hand throughout my own diplomatic career, as have many of my many friends an colleagues from MFAs across the world.
"Foreign policy can learn a lot from other fields."
History is another field where some are trying to introduce measurement and evaluation in order to transform history into an analytical, predictive science.
Are you familiar with cliodynamics (reminder- Clio is the muse of history)? Peter Turchin, who coined the term in 2003, also made a contrarian prediction 15 years ago based on cliodynamics that the US was headed for polarization and instability.
If you have not already done so, it might be worth looking at Turchin's cliodynamics to see if it can offer any guidance to improving efficiency at the State Department.
I haven't heard of cliodynamics but I'll check it out! History with measurement and evaluation just sounds like political science to me. I don't think anyone has the silver bullet to understanding the world, though. We'll learn by trying different things and dedicating ourselves to, well, learning.
With respect, you're not accounting for how completely the paradigm has shifted now that government has decided to do everything on Signal, intentionally have no formal policies or written records, and deliberately ignore both the law and requests from Congress. Arguing for proper M&E in this context is like making an elaborate and persuasive case for why we need proper stabling and fodder for horses on a former coach road that is now an interstate highway.
You're writing about the importance of Monitoring and Evaluation in a environment where key decisions are made via Signal chats and no records are kept of what the policy options were. In such an environment M&E, or even strategy are meaningless terms. Documents and people might still exist that use those terms, but they do not intersect with the actual practice of foreign policy.
I understand your point, but just because diplomats disagree with how the Department is being managed shouldn't excuse them from pursuing strong foreign policy.
Dan, as I've said before in commenting on your previous articles, they are a very useful contribution to answering the question, "How do we know we're being effective?" Unlike a lot of people who tackle this, you have a deep understanding of the complexity of this world and the difficulties associated with measuring success. U.S. policy is usually an important but very seldom a determining factor in what happens in Country X. And, as we all know, foreign policy is indeed an art, and it's in part the art of managing rather than solving issues, challenges and crises. It's hard to measure the productivity of the Public Affairs Section and their management of the IV Program, Fulbright, the arts, and so on except over decades, and always anecdotally more than measurably. How do you measure maintaining relations with all political parties? I gave this a lot of thought over 34 years, participated with relative enthusiasm in GPRA and every other initiative, but I learned a lot more about what worked from the gut than from GPRA. When you walk in to the Vice Minister's office, and you learn that she had a Fulbright at Duke 20 years ago - that's evidence of effectiveness! Anyway, a great piece and a great contribution to a challenging discipline. Keep writing.
Yeah, it's really hard. Even if gut instinct is all one's got, you can at least write it down, hold yourself accountable to your prediction, and try to learn from the outcome. The goal is not to be perfect, but to learn.
Excellent as usually, and broadly applicable to the field of foreign relations and diplomacy. The challenges you point out are a common denominator across ministries of foreign affairs across the globe; I've experienced it first hand throughout my own diplomatic career, as have many of my many friends an colleagues from MFAs across the world.
I always appreciate your perspective, Mohammed!
"Foreign policy can learn a lot from other fields."
History is another field where some are trying to introduce measurement and evaluation in order to transform history into an analytical, predictive science.
https://peterturchin.com/cliodynamics-history-as-science/
Are you familiar with cliodynamics (reminder- Clio is the muse of history)? Peter Turchin, who coined the term in 2003, also made a contrarian prediction 15 years ago based on cliodynamics that the US was headed for polarization and instability.
https://www.newsweek.com/peter-turchin-political-violence-donald-trump-barack-obama-riots-2083007
https://peterturchin.substack.com/
If you have not already done so, it might be worth looking at Turchin's cliodynamics to see if it can offer any guidance to improving efficiency at the State Department.
I haven't heard of cliodynamics but I'll check it out! History with measurement and evaluation just sounds like political science to me. I don't think anyone has the silver bullet to understanding the world, though. We'll learn by trying different things and dedicating ourselves to, well, learning.
With respect, you're not accounting for how completely the paradigm has shifted now that government has decided to do everything on Signal, intentionally have no formal policies or written records, and deliberately ignore both the law and requests from Congress. Arguing for proper M&E in this context is like making an elaborate and persuasive case for why we need proper stabling and fodder for horses on a former coach road that is now an interstate highway.
I disagree with your implicit suggestion that one should ignore expertise unless/until politics are aligned. In fact, I think that’s bad politics.
You're writing about the importance of Monitoring and Evaluation in a environment where key decisions are made via Signal chats and no records are kept of what the policy options were. In such an environment M&E, or even strategy are meaningless terms. Documents and people might still exist that use those terms, but they do not intersect with the actual practice of foreign policy.
I understand your point, but just because diplomats disagree with how the Department is being managed shouldn't excuse them from pursuing strong foreign policy.